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1 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).  This opinion is authored by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Thus, he is accredited with the creation of this maxim.
232                         UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW                         [Vol. 44:2
Some of the most entertaining as well as challenging cases in 
America’s copyright law jurisprudence concern derivative works as 
copyrightable subject matter,2 and the closely related right to prepare 
derivative works.3 The cases are entertaining because they involve works of 
authorship like a high-end, reduced-scale reproduction of a famous sculptural 
work,4 mass produced plastic versions of a cast iron Uncle Sam bank,5 Teddy 
Ruxpin dolls,6 photographs of Thomas & Friends toy train characters,7 novels 
based upon fictionalized versions of historical subjects,8 notecards mounted 
on ceramic tiles,9 photographs of bottles of Skyy Vodka,10 iconic songs,11 and
digital models of Toyotas.12 The cases are challenging because the rulings 
are often difficult to reconcile13 due to the fact that the courts are grappling 
with copyright’s elusive originality standard14 as applied to derivative 
works,15 as well a copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative works.16
One frequently litigated issue concerns the extent to which the creator 
of a derivative work has to recast, transform, or adapt a preexisting work in 
                                                                                                                 
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 101 (2012) (definition of “derivative work”). 
3 Id. § 106(2).  See generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 229 n.3 (Carolina Acad. Press 
ed., 10th ed. 2016) (discussing the two functions served by the term derivative work). The author has been 
teaching copyright law since the Fall of 1977, either as part of an intellectual property survey class or as a 
stand-alone course. The 1977 starting date is important because the current copyright statute, often referred 
to as the Copyright Act of 1976, became effective on January 1, 1978.
4 See, e.g., Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding small scale 
reproduction of Rodin’s public domain sculpture, Hand of God, was protected by copyright).
5 See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding no copyright 
protection for a plastic reproduction of a cast iron, public domain Uncle Sam bank).
6 See, e.g., Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 
1986); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc. 658 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Tex. 1986).  In both 
of these cases, it was held that the defendants’ cassette tapes – which were compatible with the tapes inside 
the plaintiff’s teddy bear that moved and spoke – were infringing derivative works.
7 See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (photographs of the 
train characters held to be copyrightable).
8 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures, Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). 
9 Compare Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir 1997) (establishing permissible use of plaintiff’s 
note cards) with Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding 
an infringing use of plaintiff’s note cards).
10 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding photographs of 
vodka bottle held to be copyrightable).
11 See, e.g., We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., No. 16cv2725(DLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 146228, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (determining “We Shall Overcome” was not a copyrightable 
derivative work based upon public domain song).
12 See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(finding digital model of Toyota not copyrightable).
13 See, e.g., JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 87–88 n.11–12, 230–35 n.3–12; MARSHALL A. LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 59–72 (Carolina Acad. Press ed., 6th ed. 2014).
14 Diane Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company: Originality as a 
Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 106 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
15 A derivative work is one “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Another way to look at derivative works is to say that they are second-generation 
works adapted from preexisting materials such as turning a first-generation work like a novella into a play. 
JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 220–21.
16 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2018). 
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order for the new version to be entitled to copyright protection. What is the 
“minimal degree of creativity” that a derivative work author has to show in 
order for his or her creation to be protected by copyright as required by the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1991 landmark decision in Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service?17 Another often litigated issue is whether a 
defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work infringes the 
plaintiff’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works; was there an actionable 
recasting or transformation of the underlying work?18
The Supreme Court acknowledged over a quarter century ago in Feist 
that the originality threshold is very low, and that most works cross the hurdle 
with room to spare because they will possess some creative spark.19 This has 
been substantiated by the hundreds of decisions that have applied the Feist 
standard.20 Still, the problem for courts deciding these cases, lawyers 
advising their clients, and copyright scholars is that the scope of the 
originality requirement remains obscure generally,21 and is particularly 
problematic in regard to derivative works.22 Moreover, scholars have argued 
that the originality threshold is too low,23 that the law needs to be changed so 
that the scope of protection enjoyed by a work of authorship would depend 
on the extent of the work’s originality,24 that courts are not able to explain 
how a work is original,25 and that our understanding of originality needs to be 
changed in response to evolving and new digital technologies like 3D 
printing.26
These criticisms of the originality standard and the arguments for 
change are well founded, but in my opinion it is unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will revise what it said about originality in Feist or even tweak the
standard.27 Also, notwithstanding calls for a comprehensive revision of the 
Copyright Act, it is unlikely that Congress will amend the originality standard 
through legislation.  After all, the Court grounded the Feist opinion in the 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause, explaining that “[a]s a constitutional matter, 
copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess 
                                                                                                                 
17 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
18 See infra Section II.B. 
19 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
20 Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 923 (2012). See generally David 
Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 98–130 (2007). 
21 Lee, supra note 20, at 920; Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 106. 
22 See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 229–35.
23 Joseph S. Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 456, 458 (2009).
24 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1523 (2009).
25 Eva Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 1487, 1494 (2011).
26 Lee, supra note 20, at 921–22.
27 Cf. Craig Joyce & Tyler Ochoa, Reach Out and Touch Someone: Reflections on the 25th Anniversary 
of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 54 HOUS. L. REV. 257, 260 (2016) (noting that 
“the Court firmly reinvigorated a standard for originality that has proven durable, flexible, and occasionally 
controversial in meeting the challenges of copyright law in the 21st century.”). 
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more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.”28 Accordingly, this Article is 
premised on the belief that we need to live with the originality standard as it 
has evolved from the Sarony and Bleistein decisions in 1884 and 1903 
respectively,29 the Feist ruling in 1991,30 and the many trial and appellate 
cases interpreting and applying these landmarks to derivative works.  The 
courts, counsel, and copyright commentators fully understand that the 
standard is not a high threshold.
Instead of attempting to say something “original” about originality, 
the sine qua non of copyright, the goal for this Article is to make sense out of 
these entertaining but sometimes contradictory decisions concerning 
derivative works.  It does this by discussing seven recurring problems and 
common scenarios and relates these situations to how courts have handled 
these problems and scenarios in the context of the familiar maxim announced 
by Justice Holmes in 1903 that it is permissible to copy the original but not 
the copy.31 Although Justice Holmes made this statement in connection with 
his discussion of copyright’s originality standard, it relates to this Article’s 
goals because a derivative work is a copy of the copy in that it adapts or 
modifies a preexisting work of authorship.  This copy of the copy ordinarily 
will infringe if it is done without permission of the copyright owner, but this 
copy of the copy might be copyrightable as a derivative work when it is done 
with permission.32
It is not arbitrary to categorize copyright law decisions dealing with 
derivative works and the right to prepare derivative works by discussing 
recurring problems and common scenarios.  For example, taxonomies have 
been recognized, discussed, and analyzed in connection with copyright’s fair 
use doctrine generally and the transformative use doctrine in particular.33
Providing structure like this is more than an exercise of selecting and sorting.  
Rather, the problems and scenarios in this article illustrate the basic challenge 
of balancing the intellectual property rights of authors which provides an 
incentive to create, against the need for subsequent authors to build upon and 
adapt the works of other authors.34 After all, derivative works by definition 
                                                                                                                 
28 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).  See also Joyce & Ochoa, supra 
note 27, at 288. The Court constrained the power of Congress to legislate under the Copyright Clause in 
affording protection to works that do not meet the constitutional requirement of originality. LEAFFER, supra 
note 13, at 60–61. Congress could, however, heighten the standard, perhaps requiring more than a modicum 
of creativity. See id.
29 See generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
30 See generally Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
31 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
32 See infra notes 56–74 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., David Shipley, A Transformative Use Taxonomy: Making Sense of the Transformative 
Use Standard, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 267, 267–68 (2018); Neil Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011); Michael Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
34 Shipley, supra note 33, at 269.
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build upon preexisting works,35 and it was said long ago in an important 
copyright law decision that few things are “strictly new and original 
throughout” and every work “in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.”36
Also, it is hoped that this Article’s discussion of these problems and scenarios 
might, as a practical matter, help lawyers when they advise a client about the 
pros and cons of going forward with a particular creative project, the pluses 
and minuses of asserting an infringement claim, or the odds which might be 
faced in fighting allegations of infringement.  But first, it is necessary to state 
some fundamental principles about the originality standard and derivative 
works.
I. BLACK LETTER LAW – ORIGINALITY AND DERIVATIVE WORKS 
In 1884, the United States Supreme Court broadly defined the terms 
“author” and “writing” in the Copyright Clause37 in Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.38 It stated:
An author . . .  is “he to whom anything owes its origin; 
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or 
literature.” . . .  By writings in that clause is meant the literary 
productions of those authors, and Congress very properly has 
declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, 
engraving, etching, [et]c., by which the ideas in the mind of 
the author are given visible expression. . . . 
We entertain no doubt that the Constitution is broad enough 
to cover an act authorizing copyright [protection] of 
photographs, so far as they are representatives of original 
intellectual conceptions of the author.39
The Court made clear that to qualify for copyright protection a work had to 
be an original intellectual conception: the product of a person’s intellectual 
invention.40 Moreover, there was little doubt that plaintiff Napoleon Sarony 
had satisfied the originality standard in how he posed the subject of the 
                                                                                                                 
35 “[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization …” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “derivative works”).
36 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
37 Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of science and useful [a]rts, by securing 
for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to the their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries…” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
38 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
39 Id. at 57–58.  See also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1875) (stating “while the word writings 
may be liberally construed, . . . it is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative powers of the 
mind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of 
books, prints, engravings and the like.”) (emphasis added). 
40 Joyce & Ochoa, supra note 27, at 267.
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photograph, set up the lights, arranged the setting and the accessories to the 
photograph, and evoked the desired expression.41
Less than two decades later, in a dispute over whether posters 
advertising a circus could be protected by copyright, the Court had this to say 
about originality:
It is obvious also that the plaintiffs’ case is not affected by 
the fact, if it be one, that the pictures represent actual groups 
- visible things. They seem from the testimony to have been 
composed from hints or description, not from sight of a 
performance. But even if they had been drawn from the life, 
that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite 
proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or 
Whistler was common property because others might try 
their hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the 
original. They are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the 
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality 
always contains something unique. It expresses its 
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of 
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. 
That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction 
in the words of the act.42
Justice Holmes made this statement in his very influential Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing opinion.  This landmark decision clarified 
copyright law’s originality standard while upholding protection for the 
plaintiff’s circus posters.43 The decision’s impact on copyright was dramatic 
because it set a very low threshold for originality,44 and Bleistein remained 
the Supreme Court’s last word on originality until the Feist decision in 
1991.45
Feist is another copyright landmark decision.46 The facts were 
simple. Rural Telephone published a standard white pages directory with 
names and phone numbers listed in alphabetical order, and Feist, a competing 
publisher of phone books, copied about 1300 of Rural’s names and 
numbers.47 The trial court found infringement, and the Tenth Circuit Court 
                                                                                                                 
41 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
42 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903). 
43 Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 77–78. The lower courts had denied protection for the posters, saying 
that they were mere advertisements unconnected with the fine arts. The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument. Joyce & Ochoa, supra note 27, at 268–69.
44 Joyce & Ochoa, supra note 27, at 269 (commenting that the case “set forth an extremely modest 
standard of originality”).
45 See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also Zimmerman, 
supra note 14, at 100. 
46 See generally Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
47 Id. at 344.
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of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed.48 It held that Rural’s 
copyright did not protect the names and numbers copied by Feist, and it 
declared that originality – independent creation and a modest degree of 
creativity – is a constitutional requirement for copyright.49 This decision 
arguably raised the originality hurdle ever so slightly from Bleistein, but the 
requirement remains far from stringent.50
Because this Article discusses the challenge of applying the 
originality standard to close questions about protection for derivative works 
and questions about the scope of that protection, it is important to set forth 
some of the originality principles that emerged from the Court’s 1991 Feist 
ruling denying copyright protection for Rural’s compilation.  The Court stated 
that the concept of originality – the sine qua non of copyright – explains the 
tension between two fundamental principles: that facts are not copyrightable, 
but compilations of facts are copyrightable.51 An original work is one that is 
independently created by its author and that possesses at least a minimal 
degree of creativity.  The requisite level of creativity is low,52 and most works 
will satisfy this standard since they will possess some creative spark.53 The 
Court emphasized that it does not matter whether a work is crude or humble 
or obvious.  Novelty is not required,54 but the Court clearly rejected the labor, 
industrious collection, and sweat-of-the-brow theories of copyright 
protection.55
Although the Feist decision concerned copyright protection for a 
standard telephone directory,56 the decision “affects all varieties of works of 
authorship when the issue of originality arises.”57 Accordingly, it is necessary 
to ask how the standard applies to works of authorship which are original in 
the “independent creation” sense, but are based upon or adapted from a 
preexisting work of authorship.  A derivative work is defined in the Copyright 
Act as: 
                                                                                                                 
48 Id. at 363–64. 
49 Id.
50 Id. at 358.
51 Id. at 345.
52 Id.at 347 (relying on the premise that “‘a modicum of intellectual labor . . . clearly constitutes an 
essential constitutional element’”).
53 Id. at 345. 
54 Id. at 345–46. See also Shipley, supra note 20, at 94–98.
55 See Joyce & Ochoa, supra note 27, at 270–82, 296 (discussing the development of these theories of 
copyright protection and explaining that Feist banished sweat of the brow.)  Other courts have said that the 
demonstration of physical skill or special training to convert something from one material to another is 
often not enough to satisfy the originality standard. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d 
Cir. 1976).   
56 Directories fit within the compilation category of copyrightable subject matter defined as “a work 
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, 
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).  See also id. at § 103.
57 LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 60. 
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[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as 
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form 
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative 
work.”58
It is well established that derivative works can be based upon works in the 
public domain which are no longer protected by copyright as well as upon 
copyrighted works.59 Of course, when one wants to adapt or recast a work of 
authorship that is still protected by copyright, it is necessary to secure 
permission from the copyright owner to create a derivative work based upon 
that work.60 The statute also provides that copyright in a derivative work 
“does not extend to any part of the work in which [the preexisting] material 
has been used unlawfully,”61 and several courts have said that changes in 
medium generally do not involve sufficient originality to justify copyright 
protection.62 The key limitation on the scope of protection enjoyed by the 
creator of a derivative work is that copyright in the new version extends only 
to the material added by the second author, and does not affect the copyright 
or public domain status of the preexisting work that was adapted.63
Well over thirty years ago, Judge Richard Posner espoused an 
argument for an elevated originality standard for derivative works.64 He 
                                                                                                                 
58 17 U.S.C. § 101.
59 See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding the plaintiff’s 
photographs of the “Thomas & Friends” characters, taken with permission of the copyright owner, were 
copyrightable derivative works); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(holding the plaintiff’s mezzotint reproductions of old masters contained the necessary amount of 
originality in order to be protected).
60 Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right “to prepare derivative 
works based upon the copyrighted work.” See generally Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that plaintiff’s original and creative use of the late entertainer’s copyrighted symbol could not be 
protected by copyright because the symbol was used without Prince’s permission and hence unauthorized).  
See also 17 U.S.C. § 103(a); Meagan Flynn, Harper Lee’s estate sues over ‘To Kill a Mickingbird’ 
Broadway adaptation. Atticus at issue., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2018/03/15/harper-lees-estate-sues-over-to-kill-a-mockingbird-broadway-
adaptation-atticus-at-issue/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a05f9c2bc3d7 (article about the Estate of Harper 
Lee filing suit over a Broadway adaptation of the novel “To Kill a Mockingbird” and arguing that 
screenwriter Aaron Sorkin’s script wrongly altered Atticus Finch and other copyrightable characters in the 
book).
61 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
62 See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622–23 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 
1980); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
63 The statute states that “[t]he copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the 
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed 
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.” 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
64 Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983). He later wrote that “[s]ome courts 
have required that the increment [of new expression] be significant, worrying that if it is set too low, and 
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asserted that requiring a slightly higher quantum of originality for derivative 
works might prevent potential overlapping claims.65 For example, assume 
that two separate creators of second-generation works each have a license 
from the copyright holder with both licensees authorized to make small toys 
based upon a copyrighted cartoon character; derivative work copyright 
claimant #1 comes out first with its toy and argues that derivative work 
claimant #2 did not copy the underlying protected cartoon character (the 
original) but instead copied its toy (the copy) – derivative work #1; the first 
licensee is thus able to use its derivative work copyright to harass the second 
licensee of the copyright owner.66 Another way to appreciate Posner’s 
concern about overlapping claims is to recognize that requiring a higher 
standard of originality for derivative works might make it easier to determine 
whether a second derivative work creator copied the underlying copyrighted 
work (the original) or the other creator’s derivative work (the copy).67
Although Judge Posner’s law and economics argument for a higher 
originality hurdle for derivative works had followers,68 the Seventh Circuit 
ultimately decided against going with a higher standard in its Shrock 
decision.69 Accordingly, the prevailing view is that the originality standard 
as announced in Feist applies to derivative works without change.70 The 
copyrightability question for derivative works “is whether there is sufficient 
nontrivial expressive variation in the derivative work to make it 
distinguishable from the underlying work in some meaningful way.”71 An 
adaptation that is not sufficiently original cannot be considered a derivative 
work.72 This is no more demanding than the originality standard as applied 
to other works.  It is a low hurdle, but the derivative work still must exhibit 
more than a trivial variation from the underlying public domain work or 
                                                                                                                 
if the original and derivative copyrights happen to be in different hands . . . the costs of determining 
infringement could be prohibitive.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 356 
(1989).
65 Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304.
66 Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 910.
67 Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). Judge Posner 
illustrated this concern with a hypothetical involving the Mona Lisa. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304.  See 
also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 232 n.5–6; LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 67–68, n.92. 
68 Entm’t Research., 122 F.3d at 1220.
69 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 230 n.4; LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 69. Nevertheless, derivative 
work claimants, who have slightly adapted or modified public domain works, continue to assert their rights 
against persons who wish to use the public domain work. See, e.g., Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 
755 F.3d 496, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (unwilling to pay for license to use Sherlock Holmes, plaintiff sued for 
declaratory judgment that he was free to use materials from 50 Holmes stories in the public domain); We 
Shall Overcome Found. v. The Richmond Org., Inc., No. 16cv2725(DLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146228, 
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017) (unwilling to obtain license to use “We Shall Overcome,” the plaintiff 
obtained a declaratory judgment that the melody and first verse of the song were in the public domain).
70 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009). 
71 Id. at 521.  See also Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 
1985) (holding that trivial, insubstantial contributions resulting in miniscule variations do not meet the 
originality requirement). 
72 Wood v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 992 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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copyrighted work upon which it is based in order to be protected.73 The 
copyrightable element of a derivative work is the newly added material 
contributed by its author.74
The black letter law is thus relatively easy to state: the originality 
standard for derivative works is the same as the originality standard for works 
in general.  Still, application and explanation of the standard in the contexts 
of both copyrightability analysis and determining infringement can 
sometimes be a challenge.  Here are some of the recurring problems as well 
as the application of some familiar, often-quoted principles of copyright law.
II. DERIVATIVE WORKS AND THE HOLMES MAXIM
This Article does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of all 
decisions involving derivative works and the right to prepare derivative 
works.  Instead, it presents a selection of decisions which best illustrate the 
scenarios and the problems.  I have been teaching many of the cases discussed 
in this Article during my forty plus year career in legal education, I have 
written exam questions about many of them, I have my favorites, and I have 
long wanted to put them together to make sense of all of them.
A. Notwithstanding the Holmes maxim, copying the copy is sometimes 
permissible, but ordinarily quite risky.
The Bleistein decision established a low threshold for satisfying the 
originality standard.75 As a practical matter, the Court held that the plaintiff’s 
poster depicting a circus scene with acrobats and bicycles was copyrightable, 
and that it was permissible for another artist to depict those acrobats and 
bicycles (copy the original); but by reason of the plaintiff’s copyright, the 
other artist could not copy the plaintiff’s depiction (copy the copy).76
Notwithstanding the pedigree of this familiar maxim about copying the 
original but not the copy, it has been tested in several cases in which courts 
ultimately held that it was permissible for a defendant to copy someone else’s 
copy instead of making its own version of the original work.77
A case involving toys based on Disney characters illustrates an 
exception to the maxim as well as Judge Posner’s concern about overlapping 
claims.  Tomy Corporation made three-inch wind-up plastic toys based on 
Mickey Mouse and other copyrightable Disney characters.78 They did this 
                                                                                                                 
73 LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 68.
74 A derivative work must be substantially copied from a preexisting work so that it would be regarded 
as infringing if done without permission. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984).
75 Joyce & Ochoa, supra note 27, at 308; Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 101.  See generally Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
76 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251?252.
77 See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Entm’t Research Grp., 
Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
78 Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 908. See supra notes 64–71.
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under license from Disney because otherwise these reproductions, though in 
different mediums, would have infringed Disney’s copyrights as unauthorized 
derivative works.79 Durham Industries conceded it used Tomy’s toys as 
models for its wind-up plastic toys – it copied Tomy’s copies of the 
copyrighted Disney characters – and it sought a declaratory judgment that it 
had not infringed.80 Tomy counterclaimed for infringement, but the trial court 
dismissed that claim on Durham’s motion for summary judgment, ultimately 
concluding that Tomy’s adaptations of the familiar characters were not 
copyrightable because they “lacked even a modest degree of originality.”81
The Second Circuit affirmed. It acknowledged that Tomy’s creations were 
derivative works, which are explicitly included in the subject matter of 
copyright, but limited in the following ways:82
First, to support a copyright the original aspects of a 
derivative work must be more than trivial. Second, the scope 
of protection afforded a derivative work must reflect the 
degree to which it relies on preexisting material and must not 
in any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in 
that preexisting material.83
Accordingly, the only aspects of Tomy’s wind-up toy renditions of Disney’s 
characters entitled to protection were whatever nontrivial original features it 
had contributed to Mickey, Donald Duck, Pluto, and others.84 The court said 
that reproducing the characters in three-dimensions and in plastic did not 
constitute originality for purposes of copyright protection, and that Tomy had 
not shown that its toys had any distinguishable variation or independent 
creation from Disney’s characters.85 Moreover, the court warned that 
extending protection to miniscule variations “‘would simply put a weapon for 
harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers.’”86 The court explained that:
[i]f we were to recognize Tomy’s derivative copyrights in its 
figures, those who, like Durham, have obtained from Disney 
the right to copy Disney’s own characters would, as a 
practical matter, have to make substantial changes in these 
characters in order to avoid infringing Tomy’s rights. In 
                                                                                                                 
79 Id. at 909.
80 Id. at 907. 
81 Id. at 905, 908, 911. 
82 Id. at 909.
83 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2018)).
84 Id. (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
85 Id. at 910.  See also LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 66.
86 Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 910 (quoting Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492). The Compendium of the U.S. 
Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition, states at section 313.4(A) that a toy model that is an exact replica 
of a useful article where no creative expression has been added is not copyrightable. Mere copies of another 
work of authorship are not copyrightable. U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office 
Practices § 313.4(A) (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Compendium]. The court’s concerns about harassment can 
also be explained as trying to avoid overlapping claims. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
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theory, of course, there would be no infringement of Tomy’s
rights if Durham copied Disney's characters and not Tomy’s 
figures, but because proof of access plus substantial 
similarity can support a finding of infringement, Durham 
would at the very least be vulnerable to harassment. Yet[,]
any significant changes made by Durham to avoid liability 
would carry it away from the original Disney characters, in 
which Tomy concededly has no copyrights, and Disney’s
right to copy (or to permit others to copy) its own creations 
would, in effect, be circumscribed.87
Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, 
Inc.88 is similar to Tomy’s dispute with Durham over the Disney toys. 
Entertainment Research Group (“ERG”) made large inflatable costumes worn
by people at publicity events.89 These costumes were based upon 
copyrightable two-dimensional cartoon characters like the Pillsbury 
Doughboy and Cap’n Crunch, and were made with permission of the 
copyright owners.90 ERG had a business relationship with defendant Genesis 
that deteriorated and ultimately resulted in a suit in which ERG alleged that 
Genesis and another entity had, among other things, infringed the copyrights 
on its costumes.91 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, holding that ERG did not possess valid copyrights in its costumes 
based upon the preexisting copyrighted two-dimensional cartoon 
characters.92
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, after distinguishing its earlier Doran 
ruling, in which it had upheld copyright protection for a three-dimensional 
inflatable version of a public domain rendition of Santa Claus.93 The court 
relied upon the Second Circuit’s decision in Durham and said that this case 
was different from its earlier Santa dispute because ERG’s costumes were 
based upon cartoon characters still protected by copyright.94 The variations 
between ERG’s costumes and those protected characters were too trivial to 
warrant protection.95 The court explained that if protection for adaptations of 
copyrighted works was afforded too easily, “the owner of the underlying 
copyrighted work would effectively be prevented from permitting others to 
copy her work since the original derivative copyright holder would have a de 
facto monopoly due to her ‘considerable power to interfere with the creation 
                                                                                                                 
87 Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 911. Supra note 86.
88 122 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 1997).
89 Id. at 1214.
90 Id. at n.2. 
91 Id. at 1215.
92 Id. at 1216.
93 Id. at 1219–20 (distinguishing Sunset House Distrib. v. Doran, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962)).
94 Id. at 1220.  
95 Id. at 1222–24.  
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of subsequent derivative works from the same underlying work.’”96 This 
statement echoed the concerns raised by the Second Circuit in the Durham
decision about affording protection for adaptations of copyrighted works with 
only trivial variations from the underlying work.97
A variation on this theme is seen in We Shall Overcome Foundation 
v. The Richmond Organization.98 The defendants held two copyrights to the 
musical composition “We Shall Overcome,” registered as a derivative work 
in the early 1960s.  The plaintiffs, who had paid the defendants $15,000 for a 
license to use “We Shall Overcome” in the movie “The Butler,” were refused 
a synchronization license by the defendants in 2015.  They sought a 
declaratory judgment in 2016 that the defendants’ copyrights did not cover 
the melody or the familiar lyrics to the iconic song.99 On the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment, the court determined that “We Shall 
Overcome” was based on an earlier version that had entered the public domain 
in the 1940s and that defendants’ changing of “will” to “shall” and “down in 
my heart” to “deep in my heart” did not make the defendants’ disputed version 
sufficiently original to be entitled to protection as a derivative work based on 
the public domain song.100 In essence, the defendants had no valid copyright 
in the words and melody of the first verse of “We Shall Overcome.”101 The 
court did not agree with the defendants’ expert who said that those changes 
in the public domain work rendered the meanings of the two versions different 
and entitled the defendants’ version to copyright protection as a derivative 
work.102 In short, it was permissible for the plaintiffs to use the defendants’ 
copy because the copy did not have sufficiently distinguishable variations 
from the original song to be entitled to copyright protection.103 Thus, it was 
impermissible for the defendants to insist that the plaintiffs pay to use their 
only slightly-altered version of the public domain song.104 This is another 
illustration of the risk of affording copyright protection to a derivative work 
that has only trivial differences from a public domain work. 
                                                                                                                 
96 Id. at 1220 (quoting Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983)).
97 See also supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
98 No. 16cv2725(DLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146228 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017).
99 Id. at *21 
100 Id. at *26, *35–37.
101 Id. at *57
102 For a variation on this theme of seeking declaratory relief to the effect that your work doesn’t 
infringe the defendant’s work because it is based on works in the public domain, see Cabell v. Zorro Prods., 
No. 5:15-cv-00771-EJD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80262, *2-4, *41 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (in which the 
plaintiff, the author of the 1996 musical titled “Z – The Musical of Zorro,” was declared not to have 
infringed copyrights held by defendant Zorro Productions because the plaintiff was able to show that the
musical was based entirely on works with the character Zorro that were both in the public domain, a 1919 
story and a 1920 silent movie). See also Robert Loerzel, Lawsuits aim to put iconic folk songs back in the 
public domain, ABA J. (Nov. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/this_song_is_our_song; 
John Patterson, Copyright Law: Overcoming Claims of Copyright Protection for Derivative Works, BAKER 
STERCHI COWDEN & RICE (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.bscr-law.com/?t=40&an=71848&format=xml&
stylesheet=blog&p=5258.  
103 We Shall Overcome, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146228, at *31?32, *51?54.
104 Id. at *57.
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The parties in these cases got away with copying a copy without a 
license or permission instead of adapting the original work. Whether one 
agrees with the concerns about the risk of being too lenient with applying the 
originality standard to derivative works, it is safe to say that if it appears that 
a company has reproduced another’s authorized copy of a preexisting 
copyrighted work, that company is likely to be sued for copyright 
infringement.  The alleged infringer of the authorized copy might ultimately 
prevail if it can show it copied the original protected work with permission, 
or that the copy it copied was not protected by copyright because it failed to 
meet the originality standard.  Still, the alleged infringer will have to bear the 
costs of defending the claim.  Even though the Copyright Act provides for the 
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,105 given the closeness of these 
and similar derivative work cases, the award of fees to the prevailing party is 
not a sure thing.106
B. Copying the copy is risky even when the original is in the public domain.
Is it permissible to copy the copy when the original work of 
authorship is in the public domain?  The answer is “sometimes,” but the safest 
approach is to copy the public domain original as the United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”) learned the hard way when it mistook a Las Vegas replica 
of the real Statue of Liberty in creating its 2010 “forever” stamp.107 The Post 
Office picked a photo for its new stamp by searching Getty Images, released 
the stamp in 2010, and in 2011, after printing 3 billion stamps, a collector 
determined that the USPS had used a photographic image of the wrong Lady 
Liberty.108 The replica’s sculptor sued for infringement, the court determined 
that his replica of the Statue of Liberty in front of a Las Vegas casino had 
sufficient artistic variations from the public domain gift from France to be 
protectable as a derivative work, and awarded him $3.5 million in damages.109
The USPS got in trouble for copying the copy instead of the public domain 
original, and this is not an uncommon scenario as illustrated by the following 
cases.
                                                                                                                 
105 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2018).
106 See generally David Shipley, Discouraging Frivolous Copyright Infringement Claims: Fee Shifting 
under Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 as an Alternative to Awarding Attorney’s Fees under Section 505 of 
the Copyright Act, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 35–41 (2016).
107 Ashley May, Postal Service Misidentifies Statute of Liberty in Stamp in a $3.5 million Mistake,
USA TODAY (July 6, 2018, 6:39 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/07/06/
postal-service-misidentifies-statue-liberty-stamp-million-mistake/762306002/.
108 Id.
109 Statue of Liberty stamp mistake to cost U.S. Postal Service $3.5M, CBS NEWS (updated July 8, 
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/statue-of-liberty-stamp-mistake-to-cost-u-s-postal-service-3-5-
million/.  See also Frankfurt Kurnit, Clear All Copyrights: Original Subject, Derivative Version, 
Photograph . . ., FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ (updated July 12, 2018), available at http://www.mon
daq.com/unitedstates/x/718504/Copyright/Clear+All+Copyrights+Original+Subject+Derivative+Version
+Photograph.
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In Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., the plaintiff claimed 
that Corel had infringed the copyright on its digital and photographic 
reproductions of public domain paintings; in essence, it had copied 
Bridgeman’s copies, not the original public domain works that it could have 
copied without permission.110 Bridgeman has a large library of photographs 
of public domain works, both transparencies and in digital format, and it 
asserted that Corel’s CD-ROM of photos of old masters had reproduced its 
digital photographs.111 Both parties moved for summary judgement in the 
original action. The court ruled in favor of defendant Corel, and then reached 
the same result on reconsideration.112
In the first ruling the court applied the law of the United Kingdom 
and held that Bridgeman’s reproductions were not original and thus 
unprotected by copyright.113 These particular reproductions were in a 
different medium, but they were exact copies – without any avoidable 
additions, alterations to, or transformations of the public domain works.114 In 
the second proceeding, the court applied United States law and came out the 
same way.115 The definition of derivative works includes art 
reproductions,116 and Bridgeman’s transparencies and digital reproductions 
required considerable technical skill and effort, but they did not satisfy the 
originality standard announced in Feist because Bridgeman sought absolute 
fidelity in making its copies of famous public domain paintings.117 They were 
slavish copies.118 Bridgeman’s labor and effort to make its copies did not 
qualify them for copyright protection.119 Corel was free to copy Bridgeman’s 
non-copyrightable copies of the old masters as well as to make its own 
reproductions of those original public domain paintings.120 Of course, 
copying Bridgeman’s copies resulted in lengthy litigation.
                                                                                                                 
110 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), reconsideration 
granted, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
111 Bridgeman Art Library, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 423?24.
112 Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 192, 199.
113 Bridgeman Art Library, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
114 Id. In contrast, the artist in the Statue of Liberty stamp litigation argued successfully that his mother-
in-law’s face inspired his design and that he had made the statue’s appearance a little more modern and a 
little more feminine than the original statue in New York’s harbor. See sources cited supra note 109.
115 See generally Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191.
116 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (definition of “derivative work”). 
117 Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
118 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988) (anything that is slavish is not original); 1 
M. Nimmer § 2.08[E][11], at 2-130 – 2-31 (a photograph is not copyrightable when it is nothing more than 
a slavish copy).
119 Bridgeman Art Library, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97. Bridgeman Art Library is cited in the 
Compendium to support the proposition that mere copies of another work of authorship are not entitled to 
copyright protection without any original contributions. The Compendium also states that an exact copy 
of the Mona Lisa, indistinguishable from the original, could not be copyrighted. Compendium § 313.4(A). 
“Whether photographs of a copyrighted work are derivative works is the subject of deep disagreement 
among courts and commentators alike.” Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 
2009).
120 Bridgeman Art Library, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
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The decision in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder is similar.121 Snyder 
made a plastic replica of a public domain, folk-art, cast-iron “Uncle Sam” 
bank and alleged that Batlin had reproduced its replica (copied the copy) 
instead of making its own reproduction of the original bank.122 Snyder lost 
because it was unable to show that its replica had any substantial originality 
above and beyond the preexisting public domain work.123 Accordingly, its 
copy, though derivative, was not copyrightable.124 The change in medium by 
Snyder, from cast-iron to plastic, was not a sufficient transformation of the 
original to qualify its replica for protection.125
In contrast to the Bridgeman and Batlin decisions, the courts in Alfred 
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.126 and Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger127
ruled in favor of the creators of derivative works based upon public domain 
works, and held that the defendants had infringed by copying the plaintiffs’ 
derivative works (copying the copies) instead of copying the public domain 
originals.  In each of these cases, the plaintiffs had highly skilled artisans craft 
exacting reproductions of famous works of art.  However, Alfred Bell was 
decided in 1951 and Alva Studios in 1959, both long before the passage of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and the Feist decision in 1991.128
The works at issue in Alfred Bell were mezzotint engravings that 
reproduced a museum’s paintings through a laborious process that resulted in 
a copy that could be reprinted easily in a book.129 Defendant Catalda copied 
Alfred Bell’s mezzotint copies of some of these old masters,130 so Alfred Bell 
sued for infringement.  Catalda argued that Alfred Bell’s reproductions were 
not copyrightable because they were faithful copies of the public domain 
paintings.131 In essence, Catalda contended that it could copy the plaintiff’s 
copies instead of the original old masters because the plaintiff’s mezzotint 
versions could not be protected by copyright.132
                                                                                                                 
121 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc).
122 Id. at 487–88.  
123 Id. at 492.
124 Id. at 490–92. 
125 Id. at 491. The Copyright Office states that a derivative work that merely reduces or enlarges the 
size of a preexisting work, without any creative input, may not be copyrighted. Compendium § 313.2. The 
results of cases raising the issue of whether a change in medium is sufficient to satisfy the originality 
standard so that the resulting derivative work is copyrightable are mixed. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, 
at 235 n.12.  
126 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
127 177 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
128 Both courts were applying the 1909 Copyright Act. See also LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 66–67.
129 Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 105.
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 104. 
132 Id.
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The trial court ruled for Alfred Bell, holding that its reproductions 
were copyrightable, and the Second Circuit affirmed.133 In determining that 
Alfred Bell’s derivative works were copyrightable, the court said that:
They “originated” with those who make them, and . . . amply 
met the standards imposed by the Constitution and the 
statute. There is evidence that they were not intended to, and 
did not, imitate the paintings they reproduced. But even if 
their substantial departures from the paintings were 
inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist’s bad 
eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a 
clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable 
variations. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, 
the “author” may adopt it as his and copyright it.134
The defendants in Alfred Bell lost because they copied the plaintiff’s 
copyrightable derivative works based upon public domain works of art instead 
of reproducing the originals.135 This result is consistent with Holmes’ famous 
maxim. Moreover, Judge Posner indicated in Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, 
Baptie & Co. that Alfred Bell and Bleistein were unchanged by Feist because 
a more burdensome or demanding standard of copyrightability would require 
judges to make aesthetic judgments.136
Similarly, in Alva Studios the court held that the plaintiff’s exacting, 
reduced-scale reproduction of Rodin’s sculpture, the “Hand of God,” 
requiring great skill on the part of the artisans who reproduced it, was 
copyrightable.137 In granting an injunction to block the defendant’s copying, 
the court said that to be entitled to copyright, the plaintiff’s derivative work 
“must be original in the sense that the author has created it by his own skill, 
labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work 
of another”138 and that 
Plaintiff has sustained this burden. Its copyrighted work 
embodies and resulted from its skill and originality in 
producing an accurate scale reproduction of the original. In a 
work of sculpture, this reduction requires far more than an 
abridgement of a written classic; great skill and originality is 
                                                                                                                 
133 Id.
134 Id. at 104–05.
135 Id. at 104?05.
136 Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003). See also
Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 107.
137 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).  But see Compendium §
313.2 (stating that the Copyright Office will not register a work that merely reduces the size of a preexisting 
work without any creative input).
138 Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 267.
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called for when one seeks to produce a scale reduction of a 
great work with exactitude.
It is undisputed that the original sculpture owned by the 
Carnegie Institu[te] is 37 inches and that plaintiff's 
copyrighted work is 18½ inches.
The originality and distinction between the plaintiff's work 
and the original also lies in the treatment of the rear side of 
the base. The rear side of the original base is open; that of the 
plaintiff's work is closed. We find that this difference when 
coupled with the skilled scaled sculpture is itself creative.139
The defendant copied the plaintiff’s copy of a public domain work 
instead of making its own reproduction of the original Rodin sculpture.140
Here again, the result is consistent with the often-quoted maxim by Justice 
Holmes.141
What should be said to someone who is thinking about marketing 
reproductions of public domain works? Is it too cautious to say he or she 
should do their own reproductions and not copy another’s replicas of those 
works? Should that advice be qualified by saying there is no reason to worry 
if those other reproductions are low quality in contrast to the high-end
reproductions your client’s artisans plan to make and sell? Will it matter 
much to a client that Alfred Bell and Alva Studios are from 1951 and 1959 
respectively, pre-Copyright Act of 1976 and pre-Feist, and that they might 
have been undermined by later decisions like Batlin and Bridgeman as well 
as Feist?
What should be said if there are other entities selling art reproductions 
like those the artisan wants to market? Do not say, “don’t worry” because the 
odds are good that there will be a suit alleging “you copied my copyrightable 
copy” instead of the original public domain work. Win, lose, or settle, there 
will be time and money spent on the issues of infringement and whether the 
copies are copyrightable art reproductions.142
                                                                                                                 
139 Id.
140 Id. at 268.
141 For a variation on this theme involving a translation of works written in 1637 in Spain, see Oliveras 
v. Univ. of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 757 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (stating that defendants, who had used 
plaintiff’s 2000 edition of the original stories in doing their translation of the works into English, argued 
unsuccessfully on a summary judgment motion that the plaintiff’s punctuation corrections and changes in 
paragraph breaks were not sufficiently creative to be entitled to copyright protection since the defendants 
had copied the copy). See also infra notes 266–271 and accompanying text.
142 See LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 66–67 (explaining why the decisions involving artistic reproductions 
are difficult to reconcile, and the risk of courts making aesthetic judgments about the level of artistic skill 
needed to make a high end art reproduction in contrast to a mass produced, low end, plastic reproduction).
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C.  It is risky to copy or use without permission another creator’s highly 
representational and accurate work, like a photograph, even if that 
photograph is ordinary.143
The scope of copyright protection for a photograph can range from 
relatively robust,144 to thin,145 and to non-existent.146 There is not agreement 
on whether photographs of a copyrighted work are derivative works.147 Still, 
the unauthorized copying of even a thinly-protected photograph can result in 
litigation for violation of the reproduction right as well as violation of the 
right to prepare derivative works.148 Does the subject of the photograph at 
issue make a difference?  For instance, what if the photo is a studio portrait 
of an individual?  What if the photo is a nature scene or a wildlife photograph?  
What if the subject of the photo is a utilitarian object that is not copyrightable? 
The answers to these questions are “it depends” and “there could be 
litigation.”149
An often-discussed decision from 1914, Gross v. Seligman,150
provides a good starting point.  A photographer posed a model in the nude 
and took a studio-style photo of her from the side, seated on the floor, with 
her arms clasped around her knees and her head tilted slightly toward the 
camera.151 He titled this photo “Grace of Youth” and then assigned his rights 
to the plaintiff.152 Two years later he photographed the same model, posing 
                                                                                                                 
143 There is some disagreement on whether an ordinary photograph is copyrightable. Compare 
Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Judge Learned 
Hand suggested that all photographs are affected by the personal influence of the photographer and thus 
copyrightable), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), with Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 
175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (photographs of food dishes on a menu were not sufficiently original 
and hence not copyrightable).  
144 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (posed studio photograph of Oscar 
Wilde reproduced by defendant); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (a 
posed photograph of the pro-basketball player Kevin Garnett used in a magazine story copied by a billboard 
for Coors).
145 Judge Hand said that “no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence 
of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike.” Jewelers’ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 
F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding that photographs of jewelers’ 
trademarks illustrating a trade circular were copyrightable). 
146 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), reconsideration 
granted, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (photographs and digital transparencies of public domain 
paintings not copyrightable under U.K. and U.S. law).
147 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2009); Ty Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l 
Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining photographs of plaintiff’s Beanie Babies dolls were 
derivative works). 
148 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (2018).
149 See, e.g., Culver Franchising Sys., Inc. v. Steak n Shake Inc., No. 16 C 72, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103091, *18–*20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2016) (claim against Steak n Shake for alleged infringement of 
television commercial dismissed without prejudice on Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part because many of the 
elements in the ad alleged to be taken, such as grilling burgers, pressing the grilling burgers with a spatula, 
and displaying a corporate logo at the beginning or end of the advertisement were not protectable; the 
plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint).  
150 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
151 For a side-by-side example of these portraits, see Michael Risch, Can You Copyright a Pose?,
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Feb. 6, 2018), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/02/can-you-copy
right-pose.html.
152 Gross, 212 F. at 931.
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her almost exactly the same way.153 The only differences were that she was 
wearing a smile and holding a cherry stem between her teeth.154 He titled this 
photograph “Cherry Ripe.”155 Litigation soon followed with the copyright 
owner for “Grace of Youth” claiming that the photographer’s new version, 
“Cherry Ripe,” infringed.156 After noting differences between the two 
photographs, the court found infringement saying that “[t]he identity of the 
artist and the many close identities of pose, light, and shade, etc., indicate very 
strongly that the first picture was used to produce the second.”157 Did the 
photographer copy the copy? One could argue that he copied the original by 
using the same model and having her pose the same way as before. 
Incidentally, later research revealed that in finding infringement the court in 
Gross v. Seligman relied incorrectly upon a dissent from an 1895 House of 
Lords decision, Hanfstaengl v. Baines & Co.,158 thinking it was the majority 
opinion.159 The English court had, in fact, found no infringement on a similar 
set of facts.160
The Third Circuit’s decision in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National 
Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc.161 stands in contrast to Gross. A wildlife artist 
painted a very realistic, representational watercolor titled “Cardinals on Apple 
Blossom” and then transferred his rights to the National Wildlife Art 
Exchange, which distributed 300 prints of the painting.162 This artist then 
painted a series of birdlife pictures including one titled “Cardinal” that was 
very similar to his earlier “Cardinals on Apple Blossom.”163 He did this series 
for the Franklin Mint Corporation and used the same preliminary sketches, 
slides, photographs, and working drawings that he used in creating the first 
work.164 National Wildlife accused the artist and Franklin Mint of 
infringement, the trial court held that there was no infringement, and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.165
After noting that copyright does not protect thematic concepts, and 
that having the same subject matter in two paintings does not prove 
infringement,166 the court acknowledged that 
                                                                                                                 
153 Id.
154 Risch, supra note 151.  
155 David W. Melville, An Author's Right to Return to a Theme: Protecting Artistic Freedom in Visual, 
Musical and Literary Works 14 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 427, 434 (1994).
156 Gross, 212 F. at 931.
157 Id. at 931.
158 L.R. [1895] A.C. 20.
159 Arthur Seidel, A Case of Variations on a Theme: Cardinal Paintings and Copyright Laws Clash in 
Court, THE PHILADELPHIA LAWYER, Spring 2001, at 48.
160 Id. 
161 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978). 
162 Id. at 63?64.
163 Id. at 64.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 63, 67. 
166 Id. at 65. 
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an artist who produces a rendition with photograph-like
clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to prove unlawful 
copying by another who uses the same subject matter and the 
same technique. A copyright in that circumstance may be 
termed “weak,” . . .  limitations imposed upon the artist by 
convention are also factors which must be considered. A 
scientific drawing of a bird must necessarily be more similar 
to another of the same nature than it would be to an abstract 
version of the creature in flight.167
There were obvious similarities between these highly 
representational paintings “[b]ut there [were] also readily apparent 
dissimilarities in the paintings in color, body attitude, position of the birds and 
linear effect.”168 Moreover, the Third Circuit did not want to prevent artists 
from returning to basic themes in order to paint variations, and it equated such 
themes with ideas which cannot be protected by copyright.169 In other words, 
notwithstanding the similarities between the realistic paintings, the artist was 
able to show that he had copied the original and not his initial copy.  Given 
the subject matter, theme, and the desire for accuracy, the first painting he 
created would have been infringed by only a slavish, virtually identical 
copy.170
Pieter A. Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide LLC is a recent decision 
involving wildlife artists depicting the same subject matter.171 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant’s 2011 painting of an underwater scene with three 
dolphins, two of which were crossing, infringed his 1979 pen and ink 
illustration depicting two dolphins crossing each other as one swims 
horizontally and the other vertically.172 The lower court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant, saying that the idea of dolphins swimming 
underwater close together is not a copyrightable element of a work “because 
natural positioning and physiology are not protectable.”173 On appeal, the 
plaintiff contended that his depiction of the dolphins was unique because the 
dolphins in his illustration were posed by professional animal trainers in an 
                                                                                                                 
167 Id. (internal citations omitted).
168 Id. at 66. 
169 Id. 
170 With the trial judge’s permission, the defendant artist painted a third work of a Cardinal and apple 
blossoms during the course of the five-day trial without referring to his two earlier works. The artist’s 
lawyer did this to demonstrate artistic variations and the absence of copying. Id. at 66.  See also Seidel, 
supra note 159, at 48.
171 Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC, 882 F. 3d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 2018).
172 Id. at 770-71. 
173 Id. at 773. See also Sarah Bro, Attempt to Claim ‘Common Heritage of Human Kind’ Sinks 
Infringement Case, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERTY (May 29, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/fr-fr/thought-
leadership/newsletters/2018/05/ip-update.
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enclosed environment and did not appear in nature in such a configuration.174
The Ninth Circuit affirmed and stated:
As a general rule, under our copyright law, an artist may not 
use copyright law to prevent others from depicting such ideas 
first expressed by nature. The basic idea of copyright law is 
to protect unique expression, . . . it is not to give to the first 
artist showing what has been depicted by nature a monopoly 
power to bar others from depicting such a natural scene.175
The plaintiff’s copyright was thin and the court said that the work’s 
protectable elements were not infringed by the defendant’s picture.176 In
short, even if defendant had copied plaintiff’s idea of crossing dolphins, this 
was not infringement because that idea cannot be protected by copyright.177
The two artists depicted the original – the idea of crossing dolphins –
differently.178
In Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. a photographer alleged that the 
defendant infringed his commercial photographs of a bottle of Skyy 
Vodka.179 The lower court dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded.180 It first held that the vodka bottle itself, as a utilitarian object, 
was not copyrightable, but the plaintiff’s photos were protectable because he 
had made creative decisions about shading, lighting, angle, and 
background.181 After further proceedings, the case returned to the appellate 
court and it concluded that defendant’s photos of the same Skyy Vodka bottle 
were not infringing because they differed from the plaintiff’s photos in terms 
of angle, lighting, shadow, reflection, and background.182 The plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s photographs both portrayed accurately the same unadorned bottle 
that was not itself copyrightable.183 Once that unprotected subject matter was 
filtered out, the copyrightable expressions in the respective photographs were 
not substantially similar.184
                                                                                                                 
174 Folkens, 882 F. 3d at 770.
175 Id. at 770–71.  
176 Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on an earlier decision, Savata v. Lowry, in which the court said that 
where the only areas of commonality between two works are elements first found in nature, expressing 
ideas that nature has already expressed for all, a court need not permit the case to go to trial. Id. at 770.
177 Id. at 776.
178 Id. To view the images side-by-side, see Risch, supra note 151.
179 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. 225 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 
2003).
180 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082.
181 Id. at 1077. 
182 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 764–66 (9th Cir. 2003).
183 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1081.
184 Id. at 766. See also Mark Sableman, Two skyline photo cases, two different result, THOMPSON 
COBURN LLP (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/in-focus/post/2018-08-
09/two-skyline-photo-cases-two-different-results (discussing two recent cases in which one 
photographer’s picture of the Indianapolis skyline was infringed by its use, without authorization, on the 
defendant’s website while the other photographer’s sunset photo of Philadelphia’s Center City was not 
infringed by an Anheuser-Busch neon sign).  
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Another way to explain this is that the defendant was able to prove 
that it copied the original and not the plaintiff’s thinly-protected photos of the 
same subject.  As in the Franklin Mint, “Cardinals on Apple Blossom” 
litigation, it is likely that only a slavish – almost exact – reproduction would 
have infringed the relatively thin copyright on plaintiff’s photos of the vodka 
bottle.185 Still, even though it can be said that defendant copied the original 
and not the copy, the similarities between the parties’ respective advertising 
photographs resulted in several years of expensive litigation, including two 
trips to the Ninth Circuit.
The risks associated with realism, accuracy and applying the Holmes 
maxim are also seen in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.;186
a decision that is not about photographs or representational paintings, but 
exact digital models of Toyotas that were used on the company’s website and 
in other media. According to the court, these digital models were superior to 
photographs because:
[w]ith a few clicks of a computer mouse, the advertiser can 
change the color of the car, its surroundings, and even edit its 
physical dimensions to portray changes in vehicle styling; 
before this innovation, advertisers had to conduct new photo 
shoots of whole fleets of vehicles each time the manufacturer 
made even a small design change to a car or truck.187
Meshwerks went through the painstaking and precise digital 
modeling process to create two and three-dimensional wire-frame depictions 
of the Toyotas that appeared in three dimensions on screen.188 The depictions 
were completely unadorned.189 They were used by the several defendants for 
advertisements in print, online, and television media.190 Once the defendants 
started using these depictions in ways alleged to be outside the scope of the 
Meshwerks’ contract, it sued for copyright infringement.191 The defendants 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s wire-frame models 
lacked sufficient originality to be protected by copyright.192 The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the court of appeals 
affirmed, saying that: 
we think Meshwerks’ models are not so much independent 
creations as (very good) copies of Toyota’s vehicles. . . .  
[they] depict nothing more than unadorned Toyota vehicles 
                                                                                                                 
185 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008).
186 Id. at 1260.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1261.
189 Id. at 1260–61.
190 Id. at 1261.
191 Id. at 1261–62.
192 Id. at 1261.
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– the car as car. And the unequivocal lesson from Feist is that 
works are not copyrightable to the extent they do not involve 
any expression apart from the raw facts in the world.  … [I]n 
short, its models reflect none of the decisions that can make 
depictions of things or facts in the world, whether Oscar 
Wilde or a Toyota Camry, new expressions subject to 
copyright protection.193
This is a close case.  Toyota and its advertising agency got away with 
using Meshwerks’ depiction of the vehicles (copying the copies) instead of 
doing new digital model versions of the cars for advertising purposes 
(copying the original).  Although the court of appeals emphasized that digital 
technology can be employed to create new expression that is fully protected 
by copyright,194 it also noted that the plaintiff’s digital models depicted no 
more than vehicles as vehicles and that the “designs of the vehicles . . . owe 
their origins to Toyota, not to Meshwerks, and so we are unable to reward 
Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models, no doubt the product of significant 
labor, skill, and judgment, with copyright protection.”195
The court did not try to distinguish cases in which defendants used 
plaintiffs’ photographs in ways outside the scope of any express or implied 
license were held liable for infringement,196 or at least had to defend on the 
merits.197 Perhaps the critical difference is that Meshwerks’ digital models 
were not copyrightable, while the plaintiffs’ photographs in those other cases 
were found to be copyrightable even though they depicted defendants’ 
products.  Moreover, the digital models were exact copies of objects that are 
not copyrightable.
The Meshwerks decision raises the issue of whether the 
representational depiction of a non-copyrightable object is entitled to 
copyright protection. Is the depiction – whether a photograph, a digital 
model, or an otherwise exact reproduction – a derivative work? The 
legislative history accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 says that the 
preexisting work, that is the basis for a derivative work, must come with the 
general subject matter of copyright as set forth in § 102,198 but the 
                                                                                                                 
193 Id. at 1264–65.
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195 Id. at 1270. The court noted earlier in its opinion, a key point underscored by the Supreme Court in 
Feist: in assessing originality, one looks “only at the final product, not the process, and the fact that 
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197 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (reversing summary 
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to determine the scope of the contractual understandings between the parties).
198 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976). 
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characterization of the rendition as a derivative work does not make a 
difference in deciding whether the rendition is copyrightable. The originality 
standard applies regardless.199 As stated in the beginning of this subsection, 
it is risky to copy or use without permission another creator’s highly 
representational and accurate work, like a photograph, even if that photograph 
is ordinary.200
D.  It is always risky to borrow, adapt, or otherwise use another author’s 
characters.
Characters, if sufficiently developed, can be protected by copyright 
apart from the story in which they appear.201 In addition, it is common for 
authors to use their characters in sequels and prequels.  For example, Ian 
Fleming’s James Bond – Agent 007 – has been the central character in 
seventeen novels and stories, starting with Casino Royale, and concluding 
with Octopussy and The Living Daylights. The sixteen novels and stories 
published after Casino Royale that feature Bond are derivative from that first 
novel.202 Not surprisingly, litigation often results from the unauthorized use 
of well-developed, copyrighted characters. There have been victories for 
authors against the creators of works which might not otherwise infringe their 
published works but for the unauthorized use of their characters. There also 
have been unsuccessful efforts to enforce copyrights to characters which had 
passed into the public domain.203
An illustration of a successful effort to block the unauthorized use of 
copyrighted characters is Anderson v. Stallone.204 Anderson wrote a thirty-
one-page treatment using Stallone’s characters Rocky, Adrienne, Apollo 
Creed, Clubber Lang, and Paulie after seeing the movie “Rocky III.”205 He 
sent his treatment to Stallone, hoping that it would be turned into another 
blockbuster.206 Stallone’s “Rocky IV” was subsequently released, and it was 
a big hit. Anderson thought that the story line for this movie was similar to 
                                                                                                                 
199 Cf. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 234–35 n.11. 
200 See supra note 143.  
201 This includes literary characters and characters depicted in comics, cartoons and other graphic 
works. See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding characters in graphic 
story entitled to copyright protection); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding 
Amos ‘n’ Andy characters were copyrightable as developed in radio scripts); Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Learned Hand’s often quoted statement about well-developed 
characters being copyrightable but holding that the plaintiff’s characters were not adequately developed); 
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1924) (holding comic book characters 
sufficiently developed for copyright protection); 
202 See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2014); Silverman, 870 F.2d at 
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203 See generally Scott Locke, Parallel Novels and the Reimagining of Literary Notables by Follow-
On Authors: Copyright Issues When Characters are First Created by Others, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 271 (2017).
204 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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the treatment he submitted, but was not compensated for this use of his 
treatment, therefore he sued for infringement.207 Stallone defended by 
asserting that his “Rocky IV” was not substantially similar to Anderson’s 
treatment, and he also counterclaimed for copyright infringement, alleging 
that Anderson had created an unauthorized derivative work by basing his 
treatment on Stallone’s copyrightable characters without permission.208 The 
court ruled for Stallone and MGM, holding that Anderson’s treatment was not 
substantially similar to “Rocky IV,”209 and that his treatment, using Stallone’s 
copyrighted characters, was an unauthorized derivative work.210 After all, the 
characters that Anderson used without Stallone’s permission permeated his 
proposed screenplay.211
The Second Circuit’s influential decision in Silverman v. CBS, Inc. 
concerned the fictional characters Amos and Andy.212 The plaintiff wanted 
to do a musical using these characters but was refused a license by defendant 
CBS.213 He then sought a declaratory judgment that the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio 
program broadcast between March 1928 and March 1948 were in the public 
domain, and that he was free to use the content of those programs including 
the characters, character names, and plots.214 The trial court ruled that the 
scripts of the pre-1948 programs were no longer protected because the 
copyrights had not been renewed.215 The court of appeals later said that the 
Amos ‘n’ Andy characters were sufficiently delineated in those old radio 
scripts “to have been placed in the public domain when the scripts entered the 
public domain.”216 This meant that Silverman could use the characters as 
developed and depicted in the pre-1948 scripts, but he could not use “any 
further delineation of the characters contained in the post-1948 radio scripts 
and the television scripts and programs.”217 The appellate court went on to 
say that “[s]ince only the increments of expression added by the films are 
protectable, Silverman would infringe only if he copies these protectable 
increments.”218 Still, Silverman could copy any physical features adequately 
described in the old scripts even though such characteristics were visually 
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208 Id. at 1167, 1169–70.
209 Id. at 1174.
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211 Most of the opinion focused on the copyrightability of the characters. Id. But see generally Olson 
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apparent in the films and tapes that were still under copyright, such as the fact 
that Amos and Andy were black.219
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd.220 illustrates an unsuccessful 
effort to block an unlicensed use of well-developed characters.  Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes “canon” with Dr. John Watson covers sixty 
novels and stories, fifty of which were published before 1923 and are in the 
public domain.221 Conan Doyle’s characters, Holmes and Watson, were 
distinctive and copyrightable from the outset in 1887, and the incremental 
addition of features by the author in subsequent novels and stories resulted in 
slightly altered characters that are derivative works.222 Leslie Klinger wanted 
to publish an anthology of stories using Holmes and Watson written by 
modern authors, but he was told by the Conan Doyle Estate that this could not 
be done without a license to use the characters.223 Unwilling to spend $5000 
for this license, Klinger sought a declaratory judgment that he was free to use 
the materials in the fifty Holmes stories and novels in the public domain (but 
nothing from the ten works still under copyright) to the extent those works 
had sufficient originality to be protected.224
Klinger won, and the Seventh Circuit, citing Silverman, said that 
“when a story falls into the public domain, story elements – including 
characters covered by the expired copyright – become fair game for follow-
on authors.”225 The copyrights on the fifty public domain works “were not 
extended by virtue of the incremental additions of originality in” the last ten 
Holmes stories.226 The court explained that:
The ten Holmes-Watson stories in which copyright persists 
are derivative from the earlier stories, so only original 
elements added in the later stories remain protected. The 
freedom to make new works based on public domain 
materials ends where the resulting derivative work comes 
into conflict with a valid copyright, as Klinger acknowledges. 
But there is no such conflict in this case.227
The court concluded by stating that “[t]he spectre of perpetual, or at least 
nearly perpetual, copyright . . . looms, once one realizes that the [Conan] 
Doyle estate is seeking 135 years (1887-2022) of copyright protection for the 
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character of Sherlock Holmes as depicted in the first Sherlock Holmes 
story.”228
So what is the lesson about using someone else’s characters? If the 
character is well- developed and under copyright, one should not use it 
without permission of the copyright owner. Here again, the Holmes maxim 
applies. Follow-on authors run the risk of infringement whenever they use a 
copyrighted character (copy of the copy). However, even well-developed 
characters enter the public domain, and if the copyright on a character has 
expired, then one can freely use that character in his or her fan fiction.229 If 
some of the character’s attributes are still under copyright, then the fan fiction 
author who wants to use that character has to be careful not to copy those 
aspects of the character’s persona.230
E. It is risky to reproduce a work in a different medium without permission 
because the new version might be an unauthorized derivative work.
There are cases in which a preexisting work is sufficiently “recast, 
transformed, or adapted” by a change in medium so that the resulting 
secondary work is held to be a copyrightable derivative work.231 However, 
there are cases in which the change in medium alone did not satisfy the 
originality requirement.232 The basic issue is whether, in the course of 
changing the work from one medium to another, the creator of the secondary 
work made sufficient expressive choices to warrant copyright protection for 
the resulting follow-on work.233 As in the other scenarios discussed in this 
Article, this issue comes up with some frequency in copyright infringement 
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233 Schrock, 586 F.3d at 521; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 235 n.12. 
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litigation, and it also presents variations on the Holmes maxim about not 
copying the copy, although it is okay to copy the original. 
For example, a photograph of a three-dimensional object reproduces 
it in two dimensions. Is that photograph copyrightable? Is that photo a 
derivative work?  The results are mixed.  The Ninth Circuit, in Ets-Hokin v. 
Skyy Spirits, Inc., said that a photograph of a vodka bottle was not a derivative 
work after determining that the bottle itself was not copyrightable.234 The 
photograph was, however, held to be copyrightable due to the photographer’s 
decisions about lighting, shading, angle, and background.235 Nevertheless, 
the court found that the photograph was not infringed by the defendant’s 
photograph of a bottle of the same brand of vodka.236
Similarly, in SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., the court held 
that although the plaintiff’s photographs of defendant’s mirrored frames were 
copyrightable,237 they were not derivative works because they merely 
depicted the frames and did “not recast, adapt or transform any authorship 
that may exist in the frames.”238 Finally, Bridgeman Art Library’s color 
transparencies and digital images of public domain works of art were not 
copyrightable because they reproduced the works with absolute fidelity and 
without the spark of originality necessary for protection.239 In contrast, after 
explaining that copyrightable original expression in a photograph is generally 
found in the photographer’s rendition of the subject matter,240 the Seventh 
Circuit in Schrock v. Learning Curve International, Inc. said that “[i]f the 
photographer’s rendition of a copyrighted work varies enough from the 
underlying work to enable the photograph to be distinguished from the 
underlying work (aside from the obvious shift from three dimensions to two), 
then the photograph contains sufficient incremental originality to qualify for 
copyright” as a derivative work.241
The lesson here is the same as expressed earlier: the use of another’s 
photograph without permission will often give rise to litigation.242 In 
addition, even if the ultimate determination is that the copyright on the copied 
photograph is either invalid or not infringed, the defendant might have 
                                                                                                                 
234 Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1081.
235 Id. at 1077–82.
236 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003).
237 SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
238 Id. at 306. 
239 Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  See 
also Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1267–69 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing to
Bridgeman, while explaining why the plaintiff’s digital models of Toyota vehicles were not copyrightable); 
We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., No. 16cv2725(DLC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146228 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 234.
240 Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009).
241 Id. at 522. The court determined that the plaintiff’s advertising photos of the “Thomas & Friends” 
toys, though accurate, contained minimally sufficient variation in angle, perspective, lighting, and 
dimension to be distinguishable from the underlying toys and thus not slavish copies. Id. 
242 See supra Section II.C. 
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avoided litigation by taking its own photographs instead of using the 
plaintiff’s photo.  In a nutshell, it is better to photograph the original object 
instead of using another’s photograph (copy) of that object.
A variation on this theme is seen in Pickett v. Prince.243 During a 
substantial period of his career, the late entertainer Prince referred to himself 
by an unpronounceable symbol that resembled the Egyptian hieroglyph, ankh,
and he licensed the use of this copyrightable symbol on jewelry, clothing, and 
musical instruments.244 The plaintiff, Ferdinand Pickett, made a guitar in the 
shape of the Prince symbol, showed this instrument to Prince, and ultimately 
sued for infringement after Prince appeared in public playing a similar guitar 
without Pickett’s permission.245 Prince counterclaimed for copyright 
infringement and won.246 The court said that: 
Pickett could not make a derivative work based on the Prince 
symbol without Prince’s authorization even if Pickett’s guitar 
had a smidgeon of originality. This is a sensible result. A 
derivative work is, by definition, bound to be very similar to 
the original. Concentrating the right to make derivative 
works in the owner of the original work prevents what might 
otherwise be an endless series of infringement suits posing 
insoluble difficulties of proof.247
Another variation on the risks involved with changing mediums is the 
repurposing of a work of authorship for a new market.  The litigation in Lee 
v. A.R.T. Company is a good example.248 The defendant bought the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted note cards and small lithographs, mounted them on ceramic tiles, 
covered the tiles with a clear epoxy resin, and then sold the tiles.249 This 
repurposing did not implicate the reproduction right, and due to the first sale 
doctrine, reselling the cards is not actionable.250 The plaintiff sued for 
violation of her right to prepare derivative works.251 The trial court and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
mounting the plaintiff’s works on the tiles did not implicate the adaptation 
right because the note cards were not recast, adapted, or transformed within 
the definition of derivative works in the Copyright Act.252 According to the 
appellate court, putting the note cards on the tile was no different “from 
                                                                                                                 
243 See generally 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000).
244 Id. at 403–04.
245 Id. at 404. 
246 Id.
247 Id. at 406.
248 See generally 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
249 Id. at 580.
250 Id.at 581.  See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) & 109(a) (2018).
251 Lee, 125 F.3d at 580. The plaintiff could not claim a violation of her reproduction right since the 
note cards were not copied, and under the first sale doctrine, the defendant had a right to resell the cards it 
had purchased. Id. at 581.
252 Id. at 582. 
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displaying a painting in a frame or placing a medallion in a velvet case.  No 
one believes that a museum violates § 106(2) every time it changes the frame 
of a painting that is still under copyright.”253
There are, however, decisions in other circuits that treat this kind of 
repurposing as within the copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative 
works.254 While one court held that adding advertising material to the text of 
a book is infringing,255 another court held that adding advertising to the blank 
“lead-in” on purchased copies of videocassettes was not infringing.256 One 
of the arguments in support of treating this kind of repurposing as within the 
right to prepare derivative works is that a transformation within the statute’s 
definition has occurred because a new work has been created for a new 
market.257
The generic issue continues to generate litigation.  For example, do I 
infringe the copyright on a magazine like Sports Illustrated if I purchase 
copies featuring front cover photos of athletes who competed for the 
University of Georgia, like Matthew Stafford, Hines Ward, Champ Bailey, 
and Bubba Watson, remove the covers, mount the covers on plaques, and then 
sell the plaques?  I think I will be okay if I am sued in the Seventh Circuit, 
but I might be in trouble for violating Sports Illustrated’s right to prepare 
derivative works elsewhere.258 One court recently stated that separating the 
cover from the magazine and cutting the cover to fit the plaque substantially 
alters the magazine, and because of these alterations, the first sale doctrine 
does not apply.259 Fortunately, I live in Athens, Georgia and there is Eleventh 
Circuit authority that I can rely upon if I am sued by Sports Illustrated in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.260
                                                                                                                 
253 Id. at 581. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 490 n.4–5
254 Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., No. 93-35743, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29405, *2–3 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 19, 1994); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988).
255 Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 544 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
256 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan. 1989).
257 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.3.1 (2d ed. 1996).  But see 
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351, 355–56 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (plaintiff 
made a doll into which tapes were inserted whereby  the doll would tell stories while the eyes, nose, and 
mouth of the doll moved–in essence, the doll was animated–defendants were held to have created an 
infringing derivative work by making compatible tapes telling different stories while animating the doll’s 
features); Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Vector Intercontinental, Inc. 653 F. Supp. 135, 140 (N.D. Ohio 1986); 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 823–24 (BNA Books 1994).
258 See, e.g., Rosebud Entm’t v. Prof’l Laminating, 958 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608 (D. Md. 2013) (finding 
that a company selling customized laminated plaques containing pages from newspaper and magazine 
articles held to infringed); Greenwich Workshop Inc. v. Timber Creations, Inc. 932 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (removing reduced scale version of plaintiff’s copyrighted artwork from plaintiff’s book 
infringed plaintiff’s rights). 
259 Rosebud Entm’t, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 608. But see Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 
1444, 1451 (11th Cir. 1998) (permitting defendant to purchase trading cards, mount, and frame them 
without alteration on an acrylic sheet pursuant to first sale doctrine).
260 Allison, 136 F.3d at 1451.
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F. The risks of translating, colorizing, and digitizing without permission.
Prior to 1870, the copyright statute did not grant authors the right to 
control translations of their works.261 In Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
unsuccessful pre-Civil War action, against an unauthorized German language 
translation of her influential novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the court said that the 
translation did not infringe because the defendant did not use the same 
“language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed.”262
Amendments to the Copyright Act in 1870 established that the translation of 
a literary work from one language to another is a derivative work.263
Accordingly, if you want to translate the latest John Grisham novel into 
another language, you will need the permission of the copyright owner. On 
the other hand, a person can translate a public domain novel by Jack London 
into another language without needing anyone’s permission, but the copyright 
on that translation will be limited to the expressive choices that owe their 
origin to the translator.264 Thus, a person’s copyrightable translation of The 
Call of the Wild to Japanese would not bar another person from doing a 
Japanese translation of that novel, so long as he or she did not copy the first 
translator’s version.265 The second translator needs to translate the original, 
not the first translator’s copy.
A recent dispute over a translation of a public domain work is 
Olivares v. University of Chicago.266 At issue were stories written in 1637 
by Zayas, a Spanish author, where the plaintiff created another Spanish 
edition of these novelas orosas in 2000 after making changes to the original 
punctuation and paragraph breaks.267 The University of Chicago published 
an English translation of selected stories by Zayas including four from the 
novelas orosas.268 The editors, who did the translations for the University of 
Chicago, used Oliveras’ 2000 edition of the stories and this resulted in 
Oliveras’ infringement claim that these editors copied his copy instead of 
copying the original Zayas work.269 The defendants challenged the 
copyrightability of Oliveras’ 2000 edition of the novelas orosas, alleging that 
his corrections of the original author’s punctuation and paragraph breaks were 
not sufficiently creative to be entitled to copyright protection.270 The court 
                                                                                                                 
261 See Joyce, supra note 3, at 488 n.1.
262 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
263 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (definition of “derivative work”). Congress amended the Copyright Act in 
1870 to give authors the right to prevent unauthorized translations of their works. This was in large part 
due to the unauthorized translation of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel.  See Joyce, supra note 3, at 488 n.1.
264 See generally Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a Jewish prayerbook translated from Hebrew to English was copyrightable and infringed).
See also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
265 LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 64–65.
266 See generally 213 F. Supp. 3d 757 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
267 Id. at 762.
268 Id.
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 767–68.
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denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, stating there was a 
genuine issue of material fact over the originality of the plaintiff’s punctuation 
corrections and paragraph breaks.271
What about taking a movie shot in black and white, and converting it 
to color?  Does the colorizer need permission of the copyright owner?  If there 
is permission, is the resulting colorized version copyrightable? Colorizing a 
movie seems analogous to translating a book, and it was fairly common in the 
1980s.  The Copyright Office announced in 1987 that it would permit 
copyright registration of colorized versions of black and white motion 
pictures as derivative works if several requirements were satisfied.272 The 
announcement acknowledged that mere variations in coloring were not 
subject to copyright,273 but stated that there might be sufficient creative 
choices from an extensive color inventory made by the colorizer that would 
modify the appearance of the film sufficiently, and thus satisfy the “modicum 
of creativity” requirement of the originality standard.  The announcement 
emphasized that the colorizing had to be done by humans, and that colorizing 
a public domain black-and-white film would not affect the unprotected status 
of that film nor prevent another colorizer from modifying that film.274 To 
paraphrase the famous maxim, the second colorizer could copy the “original” 
public domain black-and-white movie, but could not copy the first colorizer’s 
“copy” of the original movie.275
Given the treatment of translations and colorized black and white 
films as derivative works, what is the appropriate classification for an eBook 
version of a traditional hard copy literary work? What about the remastering 
of an old sound recording?  Are the new “versions” copyrightable?  Are they 
derivative works?  Do you need permission of the copyright owner before 
making the eBook or the remastered digital version of the analog recording?  
The results are mixed. 
In Peter Mayer Publishers, Inc. v. Shilovskaya, the court held that the 
conversion of a print version of a novel into an electronic version implicates 
the reproduction right, but the resulting electronic version is not a derivative 
work.276 This means that the reproduction right encompasses a digital version 
of a work of authorship, however the resulting eBook version is not 
protectable as a derivative work.  In a nutshell, making the eBook version 
copies the copy, but assuming permission to reproduce the work in digital 
                                                                                                                 
271 Id. at 769.
272 See generally 37 C.F.R. § 202 (2018); 52 Fed. Reg. 119 (June 22, 1987).
273 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a).
274 See generally 37 C.F.R. § 202; 52 Fed. Reg. 119. See also LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 68–69. On 
the other hand, the Copyright Office will not, absent creative input, register a conversion from analog to 
digital format such as transferring a movie from VHS to DVD as a derivative work. Compendium § 313.2 
275 See LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 68–69.
276 Peter Mayers Publishers, Inc. v. Shilovskaya, 11 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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form, there is nothing sufficiently creative about making an electronic version 
that warrants treating the digital version as a derivative work.
In the Peter Mayer case, the plaintiff possessed the right to publish
an English language version of a Russian novel in print format, and sought a 
declaratory judgment that this right also included publishing the novel in 
eBook form, after permission to do so was refused by the licensor/copyright 
owner.277 The copyright owner contended that the plaintiff’s right to publish 
an English translation of the novel in print did not extend to publishing an 
eBook version, because that would be an entirely new derivative work.278
The court said that the statute did not give the plaintiff “the right to use the 
[w]ork to create a new work in an entirely different medium of expression.”279
The court disagreed, saying that the forms of all works listed in the Copyright 
Act’s definition of “derivative work” reference changes in both the content
and medium of the work, and it noted that a translation “requires the selection 
of new words, phrases, and idioms that are not part of the original work.”280
The court also noted that a change in medium alone does not generally require 
sufficient originality to justify derivative work protection for the work 
embodied in the new medium.281 While an eBook is a separate medium from 
a print version, the process of transferring the work from print to eBook 
involves “nothing more than rote copying,” so it lacked sufficient originality 
and could not constitute a derivative work.282 The unauthorized conversion 
of a print version translation of the novel into eBook format would infringe 
the reproduction right in the novel, but the eBook version is not a derivative 
work because scanning or digitizing the novel involves no authorship.283
Sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, were not covered 
by the Copyright Act of 1909. Instead, these old analog format recordings 
were protected against reproduction, if at all, by common law copyright 
and/or state anti-record piracy statutes.284 It is common to remaster these 
                                                                                                                 
277 Id. at 423?24.
278 Id. at 424. A translation falls within the definition of derivative work. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
279 Peter Mayers, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 422. The novel, The Master and Margarita, had fallen into the 
public domain in the United States because of noncompliance with the formalities of our law. The 
plaintiff’s predecessor commissioned the publication of an English translation while the work was 
unprotected by copyright. The novel’s copyright was restored in 1996, and the plaintiff, as a reliance party, 
was able to continue to exploit the work so long as it paid reasonable compensation to the defendants. See 
id.
280 Id. at 427.    
281 Id. (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, 
Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
282 Id. at 428. The Copyright Office has stated that photocopying, scanning, or digitizing a literary work 
is a mere copy not entitled to copyright protection absent some additional authorship. Compendium §
313.4(A). 
283 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).  But see Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the recasting of a novel as an ebook is an example of a derivative work). 
284 See generally Joyce, supra note 3, at 205–06 (discussing the history of U.S. protection for sound 
recordings).  The Music Modernization Act, which was signed into law on October 11, 2018, extended 
copyright protection to pre-1972 sound recordings.  See Kevin J. Hickey, The Music Modernization Act: 
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analog recordings into new formats.  The question is whether a sound 
engineer’s remastering of an old recording is a copyrightable derivative work.  
The answer is yes, if that engineer subjectively and artistically alters the work 
in certain ways.285 Even though the Copyright Office has said that dubbing a 
sound recording from a preexisting recording is a mere copy that is not 
copyrightable absent any additional authorship,286 the modification or 
conversion process with a remastered recording is sometimes more 
comparable to colorizing a black and white film than it is to digitizing a print 
version of a book to create an eBook.
The Copyright Office explains in one of its circulars that: 
The preexisting recorded sounds must be rearranged, 
remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or character, or the 
recording must contain additional new sounds. The new or 
revised sounds must contain at least a minimum amount of
original sound recording authorship. [This new authorship is 
the basis for the copyright claim.] Examples of derivative 
sound recordings include:
- A mashup comprising tracks and sounds from 
multiple sources.
- Additional tracks added to a previously 
published album.
Mechanical changes or processes [applied to a sound 
recording], such as a change in format, declicking, or noise 
reduction, generally do not contain enough original 
authorship to warrant registration.287
This Copyright Office Circular was interpreted and applied in ABS 
Entertainment, Inc. v. CBS Corporation in which the Ninth Circuit, reversing 
a summary judgment favoring CBS, held that remastered pre-1972 sound 
recordings that had been publicly performed by CBS were not copyrightable 
derivative works.288 The works in question included recordings by Al Green, 
Johnny Tillotson, the Everly Brothers, Andy Williams, and Jackie Wilson.289
The basic argument against treating these remastered recordings as 
copyrightable was that they were simply digital conversions optimized for 
                                                                                                                 
Extending Copyright Protection to Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, CRS LEGAL SIDEBAR, Oct. 15, 2018, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10181.pdf.
285 See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR NO. 56, Copyright Registration for Sound 
Recordings. 
286 Compendium § 313.4(A). 
287 Supra note 285, at 3-4. 
288 ABS Entm’t, Inc. v. CBS Corp., 900 F.3d 1113, 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2018). 
289 ABS Entm’t, Inc. v. CBS Corp., No. CV 15-6257 PA (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71470, at 
*2–3 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2016). 
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digital formats using only mechanical processes.290 In essence, they had not 
been modified or altered with new sounds.291 The lower court said that they 
had undergone sufficient changes during the remastering process to qualify 
for copyright protection as derivative works, as evidenced by additional 
reverberation, different musical keys, altered tempos, different channel 
assignments, and adjustments in equalization.292 The lower court  said that 
these changes were not merely mechanical, such as trivial modifications to 
reduce noise and declicking.293 Rather, the changes constituted creative 
authorship by sound engineers,294 so the remastered recordings contained 
copyrightable original expression added during the remastering process.295
The Ninth Circuit reversed, saying that fixing sound defects and 
making other adjustments during remastering from analog to digital did not 
result in a new work.296 “Although we do not hold that a remastered sound 
recording cannot be eligible for derivative work copyright, a digitally 
remastered sound recording made as a copy of the original analog sound 
recording will rarely exhibit the necessary originality to qualify for 
independent copyright protection.”297 Accordingly, both the original pre-
1972 recordings and the remastered digital versions remain unprotected by 
federal copyright law.298
Another relevant decision on remastering and copyright protection is 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., in which the New York Court 
of Appeals held, on a certified question, that pre-1972 sound recordings were 
protected from unauthorized duplication under state law even after they had 
entered the public domain in their country of origin.299 Naxos converted 
Capitol’s pre-1972 classical music sound recordings from the original shellac 
                                                                                                                 
290 Id. at *21.
291 Id. at *21–22. 
292 Id. at *28?29.
293 Id.
294 Id. at *28–29.  See also Pryor v. Jean, No. CV 13-02867 DDP (AJWx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
143515, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2014) (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A][2][b]). But see
Compendium § 313.2 (stating that the Copyright Office will not register works produced by machine or 
mechanical process that operates automatically without creative input such as de-clicking or reducing the 
noise in a pre-existing sound recording or converting it from monaural to stereo).  
295 ABS Entm’t, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71470, at *45.
296 ABS Entm't, 900 F.3d at 1131.
297 Id. at 1132 (emphasis removed). Incidentally, in reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
discussed many of the decisions discussed in this Article, including L. Batlin & Son, Meshwerks, ERG, 
Durham Industries, Bleistein, and Fiest. Id. at 1122–1126.  
298 “Th[is] ruling could allow owners of classic recordings by artists like Al Green, the Everly Brothers, 
Jackie Wilson, and King Floyd to claim royalties under California law and potentially the laws of other 
states. If the records were covered by federal law [as copyrightable derivative works], the owners of some 
copyrights [could not] collect compensation when digital services played them.” Anandashankar 
Mazumdar, Remastering Oldie Record Doesn’t Make it New, Court Rules, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 20, 
2018, 6:06 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X4NTKA34000000?bna_news_filter=ip-
law&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016558fcdd2da377d8ff3f800003#jcite.
299 See generally Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that certain pre-1972 recordings remain protected by state law until Feb. 15, 2067).
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format onto compact discs without Capitol’s permission.300 In response to 
Capitol’s infringement claim, Naxos argued that it had created a new 
product,301 but the court held that this new product defense failed as a matter 
of New York law.302
This result is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in ABS 
Entertainment that remastered pre-1972 sound recordings cannot be protected 
under federal law as derivative works.  Naxos copied Capitol’s original 
shellac format sound recordings without permission.  However the Naxos
court did not address whether any original expression was added by Naxos 
during its remastering process of converting the shellac recordings to compact 
discs, nor whether any modifications it might have made would have qualified 
the compact discs for federal protection as derivative works.303 The Naxos 
court was only addressing whether the conversion of the shellac recordings 
violated Capitol’s reproduction right under New York’s common law 
copyright principles.304 In rejecting Naxos’ new product defense, the New 
York Court of Appeals did not address directly the issue of whether nontrivial 
changes made during the remastering process might qualify the remastered 
recording for copyright protection as a derivative work.  As noted above, the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that some remastering of old recordings could 
result in a copyrightable derivative work.305
The case law involving translations fits nicely with the general 
jurisprudence on derivative works, the right to prepare derivative works, and 
the Holmes maxim. The Copyright Act’s definition includes translations, but 
for perhaps trivial changes with punctuation and paragraph breaks, 
copyright’s originality standard is easily satisfied.  If a protected work is being 
translated, the translator/editor needs permission of the copyright owner.  If 
the original work being translated is in the public domain, then the 
translator/editor needs to work on that original work and not another’s 
translation: to copy the original and not the copy.  Colorization has fallen out 
of favor, but the digitization of works of authorship has not. Digitizing a book 
implicates the reproduction right but the resulting eBook will not be treated 
as a derivative work since it lacks distinguishable variations from the original 
work, notwithstanding the change of medium. On the other hand, the 
digitization of pre-1972 analog sound recordings, unprotected by federal 
copyright, can result in a protectable derivative work if the work of the sound 
engineers and technicians evidences sufficient creativity in the change of 
medium from vinyl or shellac to digital format. In regard to post-1972 sound 
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recordings, which are protected by copyright, the digitizer needs permission 
of the copyright owner because converting the sound recording to digital 
format implicates the reproduction right and perhaps the right to prepare 
derivative works as well.
G.  The Holmes maxim, Learned Hand, historical fiction, and the risks of 
copying the fiction instead of the history.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. is a classic Learned Hand 
copyright infringement opinion,306 often paired with his earlier opinion in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures.307 Judge Hand’s careful approach in these 
opinions, deciding whether or not there is substantial similarity of protected 
expression between the parties’ works, remains the model for copyright 
infringement opinions today.  He discusses the plots, story lines, and 
characters of the respective works; determines what is and is not protected by 
copyright in the plaintiff’s work;  states basic copyright principles; and 
explains whether the defendants copied too much of the plaintiffs’ protected 
expression.308
What ties Learned Hand’s Sheldon opinion to the Holmes maxim 
about copying the original but not the copy is that the plaintiff’s play, 
Dishonored Lady, and defendant’s movie, Letty Lynton, were both based on 
a celebrated and highly publicized real-life soap opera involving a murder, 
the arrest of a Scottish socialite named Madeleine Cary, her trial, and her 
acquittal.309 Although the actual events occurred in the 1850s, they provided 
the skeleton for plaintiff Sheldon’s play that was published in 1925.310 A
novel based on these events, titled Letty Lynton, was written by Lowndes and 
published in 1927.311 Common to all was “the acquittal of a wanton young 
woman, who to extricate herself from an amour that stood in the way of a 
respectable marriage, poisoned her lover.”312 Defendant MGM negotiated 
with the plaintiff about using Dishonored Lady, but things did not work out 
due to concerns that it would be regarded as obscene by Will Hays.  MGM 
turned to Lowndes and his Letty Lynton novel.313 Litigation ensued, with the 
court ultimately holding that MGM’s movie infringed the plaintiff’s play; it 
                                                                                                                 
306 See generally Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). Later, the 
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had taken too much of the plaintiff’s Dishonored Lady copy, instead sticking 
with the Madeleine Cary original “true to life” soap opera. Hand stated: 
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not 
himself pro tanto an “author”; but if by some magic a man 
who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode 
on a Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he 
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they 
might of course copy Keats’s.314
That is another way to say that you are free to copy the original, but you 
should not copy the copy.
Another decision of this genre involved the cause of the explosion 
and destruction of the German zeppelin Hindenburg while landing at 
Lakehurst, New Jersey, on May 6, 1937.  This well-publicized disaster was 
investigated by both the FBI and German authorities and widely covered in 
the press on both sides of the Atlantic.  Sabotage was never ruled out.  For 
this Article’s purposes, the disaster was also the subject of copyright 
infringement litigation in the late 1970s concerning a movie that allegedly 
used too much of plaintiff A.A. Hoehling’s 1962 book, Who Destroyed the 
Hindenburg, instead of relying on the original sources:315 copying his copy 
instead of relying on the historical record (the original).316
Hoehling’s book, written in an “objective, reportorial style[,]” 
espoused sabotage as the cause of the disaster.317 The official investigations 
in the United States and in Nazi Germany also raised the possibility of 
deliberate destruction, as did an unpublished movie treatment written in 1957 
by Nelson Gidding.318 John Toland published a book in 1957 with a chapter 
on the Hindenburg, and Dale Titler devoted a chapter to the disaster in a 1962 
book.319 The sabotage theory did not originate with Hoehling.320 Central to 
the ensuing litigation was a 1972 book by Michael Mooney, who admitted to 
using Hoehling’s book in writing his spin on the catastrophe.321 Mooney’s 
book was more literary than historical.322 Universal City Studios bought 
movie rights to Mooney’s book, and the director, Robert Wise, hired Giddings 
– who had worked on the topic 20 years earlier – to do the final screenplay.323
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Hoehling tried to block the movie, and ultimately lost on a summary judgment 
motion granted for the defendants.324
The court’s opinion, written by Judge Kaufman, followed the 
Learned Hand approach by discussing the historical accounts of the great 
dirigible and the tragedy; the multiple accounts published in the late 1930s 
about the Hindenburg’s voyage and the explosion in New Jersey; the several 
books and chapters written in the 1950s and 60s, including the Hoehling and 
Mooney versions; and the movie itself.325 The plaintiff’s principal claim was 
that Universal and Mooney had copied his book’s sabotage plot.326 After 
stating that such a theory, even if original to Hoehling, was not protected by 
copyright,327 the court concluded that: 
[a]ll of Hoehling’s allegations of copying [] encompass 
material that is non- copyrightable as a matter of law, 
rendering summary judgment entirely appropriate. . . . In 
works devoted to historical subjects, it is our view that a 
second author may make significant use of prior work, so 
long as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of 
another. . . . Knowledge is expanded [] by granting new 
authors of historical works a relatively free hand to build 
upon the work of their predecessors.328
In short, when the underlying topic is factual, like an historical event 
or the news, it is possible for subsequent authors to build upon the works of 
their predecessors (use another’s copy) instead of relying solely on original 
sources.329
A third example of this variation on the Holmes maxim in the context 
of historical accounts is found in Jean-Etienne De Becdelievre v. Anastasia 
Musical.330 The underlying tale involves the daughter of the Tsar, Grand 
Duchess Anastasia Romanov.  She was rumored to have fled to Europe after 
surviving the 1918 assassination of the Tsar and his family.  During the 1920s 
and 1930s, several women came forward claiming to be the Grand Duchess 
in hopes of claiming some of the fortune that the deceased Tsar had deposited 
in foreign banks.331 Members of the Romanov family in exile always 
denounced these claimants as imposters.332 One of these imposters named 
Anna Anderson inspired a 1940 play by a French author, Marcelle Maurette, 
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that presented a fictionalized version of some of these events.333 With this 
author’s permission, the play was translated into English in 1952 by Guy 
Bolton.334 This play and translation were licensed to 20th Century Fox in 
1956 to be made into the movie “Anastasia,” starring Ingrid Bergman in the 
title role.335 Fox did an animated version of this work in 1997, and there was 
an authorized Anastasia on Ice in 1996-97.336
All of this was known to the defendant, Terrence McNally, who wrote 
a musical called “Anastasia” that premiered in 2017.337 He was able to get a 
license from Fox, but not from the plaintiffs who held the rights to the play 
by Maurette and the translation by Bolton.338 They sued for infringement, 
alleging that the musical was an unauthorized derivative work.339 McNally 
moved for summary judgment, and the court had to determine whether there 
was substantial similarity of protected expression after extracting the non-
copyrightable historical facts from the respective works.340 Sticking with the 
basic format of the opinions in Sheldon and Hoehling, the court summarized 
the historical facts, the play, and the musical; set forth the basic legal 
principles; and concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate even 
though both sides relied on historical events.341 In short, McNally copied too 
much of the protected copies, instead of relying on the factual accounts of 
Anna Anderson’s claim to be the Duchess Anastasia.342
III. CONCLUSION
This Article has classified copyright law decisions dealing with 
derivative works and the right to prepare derivative works by discussing 
several recurring problems and common scenarios and applying the familiar 
Holmes maxim that it is permissible to copy the original but that you should 
not copy the copy.  Providing this structure has been more than an exercise of 
selecting and sorting. Rather, the problems and scenarios illustrate the basic 
copyright law challenge of balancing the intellectual property and ownership 
rights of authors as an incentive to create against the need for subsequent 
authors to build upon and adapt the works of others.343 After all, derivative 
works build upon the works of others,344 and it was said long ago in a 
copyright law decision that few things are “strictly new and original 
throughout” and every work “in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
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necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.”345
Still, unless a creator is doing something new with a public domain work or 
has permission from the copyright owner to transform a protected work, the 
Holmes maxim remains true: you are usually safe to copy the original, but it 
is ordinarily risky to copy the copy.  As a practical matter, this Article’s 
discussion of the seven recurring problems and scenarios should help lawyers 
when they advise a client about going forward with a particular creative 
project which builds upon preexisting works, the pros and cons of asserting 
an infringement claim when another author has arguably copied his or her 
copy, or the odds which might be faced in fighting an infringement claim 
when the client is alleged to have taken too much from a protected work.
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